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The international diffusion of technology presents an opportunity for developing economies distant from the world technological frontier to reduce their income gap relative to advanced economies. It is therefore crucial to understand why, when faced with similar technological alternatives different firms in different countries choose to adopt different vintages of capital. This paper examines technology adoption across firms in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The findings show that access to complementary inputs-managerial capacity, skilled labor, finance, and good infrastructure -and to international knowledge-through foreign direct investment or exports-is an important correlate This paper-a product of the Trade Team, Development Research Group-is part of a larger effort in the department to understand the links between technology diffusion, openness and the investment climate. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at afernandes@worldbank.org. of technology adoption. The link between market incentives and technology adoption is more nuanced. Although consumer pressure results in technology adoption, competitor pressure does not, suggesting that only firms with rents are able to adopt technology given substantial resource constraints. Privatized firms exhibit better technology adoption outcomes but only when a clear private owner with a profit incentive is present. Better governance is associated with technology adoption only in the countries that joined the European Union in 2004. Future increases in technology adoption by firms in the region will require complementary reforms of the investment climate.
I. Introduction
Two central tenets of growth theory are that total factor productivity (TFP) differences can explain cross-country variation in real incomes to a large extent, and that technology, defined broadly as knowledge relevant to production, is an important determinant of TFP across countries and across firms (Easterly and Levine, 2001; Hall and Jones, 1999; Prescott, 1998; Parisi et al., 2006) .
Understanding cross-country differences in income per capita requires therefore an explanation as to why firms in certain countries employ more advanced technology than firms in other countries (Fagerberg 1994; Prescott 1994, Iacopetta 2004; . While knowledge generation is to a large extent concentrated in developed economies and access to technology has been restricted in some cases (for example by intellectual property rights), the unprecedented expansion in the volume of trade of capital goods in the last few decades indicates the broader availability of embodied knowledge. According to Keller (2004) , foreign sources of technology account for over 90% of TFP growth for most countries. Technology diffusion presents an opportunity for economies distant from the world technology frontier to close the income gap with developed economies (Coe et al., 1997; Caselli and Coleman II, 2001 ).
Yet, when faced with the same technological alternatives, different firms in different countries choose to adopt different vintages of capital. Why would some firms adopt older vintages of capital when a newer and superior vintage is available? Rosenberg (1972) first argued that technology adoption is a slow and costly process that exhibits substantial heterogeneity across different technologies. Profit-seeking firms will adopt older vintages of capital when market characteristics, characteristics intrinsic to the new vintage of capital and/or country-specific frictions make the adoption of more modern techniques less profitable. Barriers to the adoption of new technologies may take different forms, such as regulatory and legal constraints, bribes that must be paid, but essentially represent a distortion in the relative payoffs facing the entrepreneurs in favor of the sub-optimal technology (Parente and Prescott 1994) . Hall and Khan (2003) summarize the literature on the determinants of technology adoption mainly in developed economies emphasizing the importance of microeconomic factors such as labor skills, access to capital goods, network effects, market structure, firm size, regulatory environment in explaining broad patterns of technology diffusion. When examining cross-country differences, the authors note that other macroeconomic factors such as the level of economic development, market size (Helpman and Krugman 1986) , openness to trade and FDI (Keller 2002) , and culture can help explain differences in the level of technology diffusion across countries. Also, Comin and Hobijn (2004) show that the most important determinants of the speed at which a country adopts a broad range of technologies are its human capital endowment, government type, degree of openness to trade, and its adoption of predecessor technologies. More recently, Parente and Prescott (2005) argue that countries have widely divergent living standards not because they have access to different stocks of knowledge, but rather because they differ in the severity of the constraints imposed on the technology choices of their citizenry. Drawing on this literature, a recent study by the World Bank (2008) concludes that the diffusion of international knowledge and technology to a developing country depends on two main factors: (i) the extent of its access to international knowledge and technology (via trade, FDI, contacts with its diaspora, and other communications channels) and (ii) its ability to absorb and adapt international knowledge and technology. This absorptive capacity is determined by the technological literacy and skills of the country's labor force, the availability of financing for innovative firms, sound governance, and a good business environment. Moreover, given the various market imperfections associated with technology and knowledge diffusion, including increasing returns to scale and technological spillovers, that study also finds scope for carefully targeted proactive policies aimed specifically and enhancing technology transfer.
Empirical evidence on the relative impact of various determinants of technology and knowledge diffusion in developing countries at the micro level is still scarce, in part due to the limited availability of data. This paper aims to contribute to filling this gap by investigating how the "investment climate", namely the incentive regime faced by a firm (related to competition, ownership, and governance), access to complementary inputs (skills, credit, and infrastructure), and access to international knowledge affect firms' technology choices. Our analysis exploits a unique dataset -the Business Our results show that access to complementary inputs -skilled labor, managerial capacity, R&D, finance and to a lesser extent, good infrastructure -are positively associated with technology adoption.
Results for the relationship between market incentives and ISO certification or web-use are more nuanced: (i) while consumer pressure is related to more technology use, competitor pressure is not, (ii) privatized firms exhibit better technology adoption outcomes only in presence of a clear private owner with a profit incentive, and (iii) better governance seems to be associated with technology adoption only in EU-8 countries.
1 Our results also indicate that access to international knowledge -through FDI or exports -is positively correlated with ISO certification and web-use, which can suggests the relevance of international technology spillovers.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the conceptual framework. Section III describes the empirical strategy and the data. Section IV presents the main results and Section V summarizes the main conclusions.
II. Conceptual Framework
We assume that firms make a profit-maximizing cost/benefit assessment of different alternatives when deciding whether to adopt new technology. A firm decides to adopt a particular new technology if the corresponding expected net payoffs are larger than those of the alternatives, including the alternative of not adopting it. Besides the cost of the technology itself, different investment climate factors may affect the expected net payoffs from the adoption of modern technology. Without the ambition of completeness, in the rest of this section we draw on a wide literature to lay out three groups of investment climate factors that may affect those payoffs. In doing so, we implicitly define a set of hypotheses that will subsequently be tested using firm-level survey data from the ECA region.
II. 1 Complementary Inputs: Skills, Finance, and Physical Infrastructure
A firm's access to complementary inputs can affect both the adjustment costs as well as the benefits that the firm derives from the adoption of new technology. First, both theoretical models and empirical evidence document how low labor skills can delay a firm's modern technology adoption due to the inability to operate advanced equipment -which tends to be skill-biased -or because learning is technology-specific and there is a high cost of retraining workers (Alesina and Zeira, 2006; Berdugo et al., 2005; Navaretti et al., 2001) . Furthermore, evidence from industrial countries suggests that in settings where labor market institutions do not allow wages or internal training to offset high hiring and firing costs, the latter reduce firms' incentives for innovation and for the adoption of new technologies, and lead to lower productivity performance (Scarpetta and Tressel 2004) . The lack of highly qualified managerial capacity (or entrepreneurship) can also constrain the firm's adoption of advanced technology as it reduces the information on available technological solutions for its needs and could increase its adjustment costs (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989 Third, based on the potential impact of transport infrastructure on outsourcing and computer use in the production process, infrastructure availability and quality can also play a decisive role in a firm's decision to acquire and use new vintages of capital. The importance of physical infrastructure for firm productivity and economic growth finds strong support from empirical work for OECD countries as well as developing countries (Roller and Waverman, 2001; Esfahani and Ramirez, 2003; World Bank, 2005a) .
II.2 Market Incentives: Private Ownership and Control, Competition, and Contract Enforcement
The firm's technology adoption decision is also likely to be determined by market incentives which refer to four core aspects of a competitive market economy. First, private ownership and control establish profit-maximization as the 'modus operandi' of the firm and should drive investment in the most productive technologies with ensuing productivity gains (Brown et al., 2007) .
Second, an important additional condition is strong product market competition from domestic and foreign rivals and/or demand from consumers which encourage incumbents to direct their investments towards new and more productive technologies -product upgrades and/or costs reductions -rather than towards rent-seeking activities (Baumol 1990; Aghion and Schankerman 2004) . Third, sound legal institutions that guarantee adequate protection of property rights and contract enforcement are critical for growth and for the development of market economies (North, 1990; Acemoglu et al., 2004; Djankov et al., 2006) . Acemoglu et al. (2007) show how greater contractual incompleteness leads to the adoption of less advanced technologies and how that incompleteness may generate sizable productivity differences across countries with different contracting institutions.
Finally, firms need to be confident that they will be able to reap the benefits from their technology adoption investments, as in the initial stages of the adoption process investments in new technology may even generate productivity losses related to capital and skills specificities, adjustment costs, and learning-by-doing (Pavlova, 2001) . Adjustment and learning costs are proportional to the technology gap. In this sense, a predictable economic and regulatory policy environment is a fourth key market incentive affecting the firm's decision to adopt new technology.
II.3 Access to International Knowledge
The firm's technology adoption decision relates to its access to international knowledge which can be transferred via FDI or through the participation in export markets. Openness to trade and FDI have been shown to be critical mechanisms for knowledge diffusion across countries (Coe et al., 1997; Keller, 2004) . Openness to FDI introduces competitive pressure on firms but also allows firms to be exposed to global best practice technology and management techniques (Djankov and Hoekman, 2000; Arnold and Javorcik, 2005) . Domestic firms that participate in export markets may increase their knowledge absorption from the interaction with buyers in advanced markets (Fernandes and Isgut, 2007; Wagner, 2007) . Thus, firms with foreign ownership and those participating in export markets are likely to face lower costs and be more likely to engage in the adoption of advanced technology.
III. Empirical Strategy and Data

III.1 Empirical Strategy
Our empirical strategy consists of testing jointly the various hypotheses discussed in Section II:
namely that firms face lower costs of adjustment and higher benefits from technology adoption and thus are more likely to engage in the adoption of advanced technology if they (i) have better access to complementary inputs, (ii) face stronger market incentives, and (iii) have better access to international knowledge. For this purpose, we assume that profit-maximizing firms decide whether or not to adopt advanced technology if the benefits from this decision are larger than its costs. 4 Let be the net benefits (benefits minus costs) for firm i in sector j in country c. If Adoption is a dummy variable that equals one alternatively if firm i is ISO-certified, or if firm i uses the web, then we have that:
ijc * π 4 A similar type of approach was used by Almeida and Fernandes (2008) to study the importance of openness for technological innovation decisions of firms in developing countries. 
Assuming that the residuals ijc ε are normally distributed, we can estimate this equation by maximum likelihood (probit).
The adoption of advanced technology is measured either by the firm's choice of ISO certification or by the firm's choice of using the web for business operations. ISO certification indicates the achievement of internationally accepted standards and technical regulations. Hence, it can be used as a proxy of the adoption of advanced technology for firms in developing countries. Specifically, ISO 9000 norms are a set of international standards and guidelines which serve as the basis for establishing quality management systems at manufacturing and services firms (ISO, 1998) . ISO 9000 certification is awarded to quality processes within a firm and requires a detailed review and documentation of the firm's production processes to be in accordance with ISO quality system requirements.
5 ISOcertification also facilitates the entry of firms into global supply chains which allows the transfer of technical and organizational knowledge from technologically advanced buyers -usually multinational corporations (MNCs) -to local firms (Arora and Aundi, 1999; Humphrey and Schmitz, 2000) .
Web-use is treated as a proxy for the firm's use of information and communication technology (ICT) in business operations. A very large body of literature documents a strong positive relationship between ICT and productivity at the aggregate, industry, and firm levels, particularly for the U.S., during the second half of the 1990s (Jorgenson and Stiroh, 2000; Cohen et al., 2004; Triplett and Bosworth, 2004) . The jump in productivity of the U.S. service sector during this period, epitomized by the revolution in retailing brought about by Wal-Mart via its substantial investment in ICT-based methods, subsequently spread to other ICT-using manufacturing industries. As such, ICT is considered the preeminent 'General Purpose Technology' of the past two decades as it has driven economy-wide growth by spreading over a range of sectors and prompting them to further innovate (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995; Helpman and Trajtenberg, 1996) .
III.2 Data
Our analysis is based on firm-level data from the Business Environment and Enterprise
Performance Survey ( Table A1 defines all the variables used in the analysis while Appendix Tables A2-A3 show the composition of the samples across countries and sectors. Appendix Table A4 provides summary statistics for all the investment climate variables. Figure 1 shows the shares of firms that adopted advanced technology by country and sub-region within ECA. In 2002, the share of firms across the ECA region that is ISO-certified is 13.6%, with the highest share being (not surprisingly) displayed by the EU-8 countries (15.9%) and the lowest by Turkey (7.6%). The share of firms that use the web in 2002 is 58.2% across the ECA region, but ranging from 37.1% in the CIS outside Russia and Ukraine (labeled as 'Other CIS') to 76.4% in the EU-8 countries. In 2005, 12.5% of firms in the sample are ISO-certified, with the lowest share being displayed by the 'Other CIS' region (8.9%) and the highest being displayed by the EU-8 countries 6 The information collected in the BEEPS surveys is based on a 1.5-2 hours interview with the firm manager. Detailed information on the surveys can be obtained at http://go.worldbank.org/RQQXYJ6210. Throughout the paper we will refer to firms as being the unit of analysis, although the surveys collect data on plants. 7 This panel sample has been used by Safavian and Sharma (2007) to study the determinants of firm access to finance. 8 However, we should emphasize that the 2002 sample and the panel sample have a relatively larger share of firms in services industries (61.4% and 62% respectively) while the 2005 sample is split evenly between manufacturing and services (49.6% and 50.4% respectively).
(15.5%). The proportion of firms that use the web across the ECA region in 2005 is 67.4%, ranging from 83.5% in the EU-8 countries to 49.2% in the "Other CIS". Table 1 shows a substantial degree of heterogeneity in technology adoption across sectors, with firms in the manufacturing sector being significantly more likely to be ISO-certified and use the web in their operations than firms in other sectors. Firms in the mining and quarrying and construction industries are significantly more likely than the rest of the sample to have adopted ISO certification but are around the average for web-use. In contrast, the share of firms in other services sectors that adopted either of these technologies is significantly lower (with some exceptions such as the real estate industry) despite the evidence that ICT has led to substantial productivity gains recently in the services sector in the US and Europe. Our findings on ISO certification are consistent with global experience whereby certification is more prevalent in the manufacturing sector where signals of quality are important for export competitiveness.
We should note that we find ISO certification and web-use to be strongly correlated with firm performance both in the 2002 and in the 2005 samples. ISO-certified firms and web-users exhibit higher average value-added per worker faster sales growth, and pay higher wages than firms that do not adopt those modern technologies.
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IV. Main Results
In this section, we discuss our main results obtained from probit estimation of Equation (2) for ISO-certification and for web-use. To proxy for complementary inputs, we consider measures of worker skills and managerial capacity, R&D efforts, access to finance, and the quality of infrastructure -electricity and telecommunications. To proxy for market incentives, we consider the type of ownership of the firm (private or recently privatized), the degree of control by majority shareholders, firm size, measures of competition, and an index measuring the quality of governance based on the quality of contract enforcement, the predictability of government regulations and the bureaucratic burden felt by firms. To proxy for access to international knowledge, we consider foreign ownership (full or through a joint venture) and the firm's participation in export markets. All variables are defined in Appendix Table 1 .
Our probit regressions include GDP per capita which controls for country heterogeneity in technology adoption that is not captured by complementary inputs, market incentives, nor access to international knowledge. 10 Moreover, we allow the standard errors to be adjusted for clustering at the country level to account for possible correlations in technology adoption decisions across firms within a country. Finally, we include sector fixed effects in the probit regressions since sector-specific differences in technology, product demand, or competition can be crucial in determining firms' incentives to adopt new technology (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989) .
A key methodological issue with our estimation needs to be raised at this point. Our main results from probit regressions for ISO-certifications and for web-use are shown in Table 2 Tables 2-5. 10 Including country fixed effects in the probit regressions is not feasible in our framework due to their collinearity with the infrastructure and governance indexes which are location specific. 11 All tables report the marginal effects from probit regressions at mean values of the independent variables. 12 Firms with more able managers are more likely to adopt advanced technology but are also more likely to hire a larger share of skilled workers and to participate in export markets. Thus, the effect of the share of skilled workers and of export shares in the technology adoption regressions may simply reflect omitted characteristics.
IV.1 Complementary Inputs -Cross Sectional Results
The results in Table 2 Firms with a higher R&D intensity are significantly more likely to be ISO-certified and especially to use the web. An increase in the firm's R&D intensity by one standard deviation (5.6%) is associated with a 2.4% increase in the likelihood of web-use, all else constant.
Our findings provide indirect evidence of skill-biased technological change by showing the importance of complementary investments in skills and R&D for technology adoption in the ECA region. Our findings are also consistent with the absorptive capacity arguments of Cohen and Levinthal (1989, p. 593 ) whereby firms invest in R&D not only to pursue innovation directly but also to "develop and maintain their broader capabilities to assimilate and exploit externally available information". R&D activities are likely to have spillover effects onto managerial activities, as firms learn more about their technological bottlenecks and possible solutions through R&D activities and managers become informed through their interaction with researchers and engineers. In sum, firms with higher shares of professionals and higher R&D intensity have better capacity to process information, i.e., to identify technological problems and solutions. Finally, we should note that for the vast majority of firms in the ECA region which do not employ cutting-edge technology, R&D activities are likely to be focused on adopting and adapting technology to local conditions as pointed out by Cohen and Levinthal (1989) : e.g., in-house technology adoption and adaptation by firms' engineers or contracting of technological services to local research institutes and individual scientists.
Access to finance is positively and strongly associated with ISO-certification and web-use.
Based on the BEEPS 2005 sample, a firm with access to a bank loan is 4.5% more likely to be ISOcertified and 15% more likely to use the web, ceteris paribus. Access to finance may be crucial not only for firms to adopt advanced technology but also to make the complementary investments needed to absorb and use efficiently those advanced technologies. Our findings provide evidence of an important micro channel through which finance may affect growth in ECA: i.e., by increasing the likelihood of adoption of advanced technology by firms.
Better infrastructure (indicated by a higher value of the index) is significantly positively associated with web-use. Since our measure of infrastructure captures the quality of the communications network in the firm's location, this finding simply reflects the fact that such quality is likely to be fundamental for the internet technology to be efficiently used by the firm. However better infrastructure is negatively associated with ISO certification, significantly so for the BEEPS 2002
sample. This result is at odds with the findings for Brazil in World Bank (2005b) . One possible rationale for this counter-intuitive sign is that the effect of infrastructure on ISO certification operates through other variables also included in our regressions -e.g., foreign ownership -and as a result, the coefficient on the infrastructure index captures only partially its effect on ISO certification. Another possible rationale is that our infrastructure index does not capture the quality of the road infrastructure.
Accounting for the costs of remoteness and the risk of losses in transit would be important to determine the likelihood of ISO certification by a firm. Nevertheless, we should note that our infrastructure index does exhibit sensible values, which are substantially higher for EU-8 and South
Eastern European countries plus Turkey (with the exception of Albania) which are characterized by better infrastructure than for CIS countries which are characterized by worse infrastructure.
Our findings on complementary inputs are not driven by any specific sub-group of countries within the ECA region. In fact, we show in Table 3 the results from estimating Equation (2) separately across three country groups: EU-8 countries, CIS countries, and South Eastern European countries plus Turkey. 13 The importance of human capital, R&D intensity, and access to finance for ISO certification and for web-use is confirmed in the three country groups. We also find a positive effect of better infrastructure on web-use and a negative -although weak -effect of better infrastructure on ISO certification in the three country groups.
Finally, we should note that our results on complementary inputs do not suffer from multicollinearity problems since the coefficients for the BEEPS 2002 and the BEEPS 2005 samples are qualitatively -and even quantitatively -almost unchanged when we estimate a variant of Equation 13 The group of South Eastern European countries includes Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Romania, and Serbia and Montenegro.
(2) where we exclude the market incentives factors and the factors related to access to international knowledge.
IV.2 Market Incentives -Cross Sectional Results
The results in Table 2 privatized firms in terms of technology adoption is due to the better complementary inputs, the better market incentives, and the better access to international knowledge which they face.
The proxy for the concentrated control of ownership shares is found in Table 2 to be significantly negatively associated with ISO certification and web-use. This result is counter-intuitive since firms with better corporate control -for which the concentration of ownership is a proxy -are expected to have better incentives to adopt new technology as the profit motive (maximization of the value of the firm) is present, in contrast to the firms with more diffuse ownership. In order to account for the counter-intuitive results, we estimate a modified version of Equation (2) 14 The results from those regressions are available from the authors upon request. 15 The results from those regressions are available from the authors upon request.
The estimates in Given the challenges involved in measuring the degree of market competition faced by firms, we check the robustness of our results just discussed by replacing the dummies for the pressure to innovate from consumers and competitors by two alternative measures of competition based on Carlin et al. (2004) . In columns (1)- (2) and (5)- (6) of Table 4 , we use a measure of the elasticity of demand faced by the firm and find that firms facing a more elastic demand (i.e., whose customers would switch to buying the product from competitors as a result of a price increase) are less likely to be ISOcertified or use the web. 17 In columns (3)- (4) and (7)- (8) of Table 4 , we use a measure of the total number of competitors faced by the firm in its main product in the domestic market and find no difference in ISO certification or web-use for firms facing no competitors versus firms facing 1-3 competitors or more than 4 competitors.
Taken together, our findings suggest that in ECA countries, concentration is more conducive to technology adoption than competition. This finding is consistent with the argument by Schumpeter (1942) that competition can be detrimental to innovation as it reduces the rents that successful innovators can appropriate. This finding is also consistent with the argument by Carlin et al. (2004) that firms in transition economies face resource constraints that make rents important in financing technology adoption. Accordingly, the results in Table 2 show that larger firms are significantly more likely to adopt advanced technology. The marginal effects are particularly large for web-use and suggest that, within a sector, firms with more than 250 workers are about 25% more likely to use the web than firms with less than 50 workers. Additionally, these findings on size are consistent with two related arguments. First, large firms may benefit from economies of scale in the adoption of new 16 The BEEPS 2002 survey provides information on market shares but also on price-cost margins both of which can be used to proxy for the competitive environment facing the firm. Table A1 for the definition of these alternative measures of competition.
technology and have more capacity to finance technology adoption in imperfect financial markets settings (Cohen and Klepper, 1996) . Note, however, that our regressions already control explicitly for firm access to finance. Second, the economies of scale from which large firms benefit allow them to operate with a more efficient division of labor resulting in better conditions for mechanization and technological upgrade.
The relationship between governance and technology adoption in Table 2 is more nuanced.
Better governance (indicated by a higher value of the index) is negatively associated with all types of technology adoption, significantly so for ISO certification in 2002 and for web-use in 2005. In Table 3 we show that these results for governance actually differ across country groups, while the results on other proxies for market incentives are similar across country groups. For firms in EU-8 countries,
better governance is associated with more frequent ISO certification and more frequent web-use. This finding is also true to some extent in South Eastern European countries and Turkey for web-use. In these two country groups, and particularly in the EU-8, predation and rent seeking opportunities have been reduced and thus better governance provides the right market incentives for more technology adoption. That is not the case in CIS countries, which drive the negative correlation between governance and technology adoption shown in the ECA-wide regressions in Table 2 . While this result may appear counter-intuitive, we can rationalize it as follows. First, this result may reflect reverse causality. Firms that are ISO-certified or use the web are likely to perform better, be more profitable, and hence be more visible to government officials and more subject to inspections, visits, and bribe extraction. Indeed proxies for bribe extraction enter the calculation of the governance index. Second, the governance result is consistent with the results for competition. In locations where governance is weaker due to poor property rights enforcement, high potential for expropriation and corruption, the firms that are more able to extract rents are those that have more capabilities to adopt advanced technology.
Finally, we should note that our results on market incentives do not seem to suffer from multicollinearity problems since the coefficients for the BEEPS 2002 and the BEEPS 2005 samples are qualitatively unchanged when we estimate a variant of Equation (2) where we exclude the complementary inputs factors and the factors related to access to international knowledge. (2) where we exclude the factors linked to complementary inputs and market incentives.
IV.3 Access to International Knowledge -Cross Sectional Results
IV.4 Input Markets, Market Incentives, and Access to International Knowledge -Panel Results
The results discussed so far suggest important correlations between complementary inputs, market incentives, and access to international knowledge on the one hand, and ISO certification or web-use on the other hand. However, since the results are based on cross-sections of firms in ECA countries in 2002 and in 2005, they do not allow us to interpret the estimated effects as causal.
Problems of omitted firm characteristics as well as reverse causality could bias the estimated coefficients in Tables 2-4 . While we do not have valid instruments to identify causal effects of the correlates of technology adoption, we observe a subset of our firms at two points in time. Therefore, we are able to apply panel data estimation techniques -probit regressions with random effects -to the BEEPS panel. The corresponding results are shown in Table 5 . In this case, we estimate the determinants of ISO certification and of web-use controlling for unobserved firm invariant effects. As Table 5 show that larger firms are significantly more likely to adopt advanced technology between 2002 and 2005. Overall, the panel findings provide some evidence that increased concentration is more conducive to technology adoption than increased competition and that there are demand pull reasons for the adoption of advanced technology in ECA countries, but the evidence is weak.
18 These results are available from the authors upon request.
The estimates in Table 5 show that in locations where governance improved between 2002 and 2005 (indicated by an increase in the value of the index), the likelihood of web-use by firms increases while that of ISO certification decreases.
Finally, the estimated effects of access to international knowledge on technology adoption are strong in the panel regressions and qualitatively similar to those in the cross-sectional regressions.
Majority as well as minority foreign ownership and the participation in export markets increase significantly the likelihood of firms in the ECA region being ISO-certified and using the web.
V. Conclusions
This find that firms with access to the appropriate complementary inputs, namely skilled labor, managerial capacity, R&D, finance (and to a lesser extent good infrastructure) and to international knowledge, either through FDI or exporting activities, are more likely to be ISO-certified or use the web. Our results suggest that the relationship between market incentives and ISO certification or web-use is more nuanced. While pressures from consumers generate demand for firms in Eastern Europe and Central Asia to adopt advanced technology, pressures from competitors do not, which may seem counter-intuitive in a developed economy setting but is consistent with previous literature that argues that most firms in Eastern Europe and Central Asia face very substantial resource constraints (particularly financial resources) and thus only those with rents are able to finance technology adoption. Accordingly, we find that larger firms are significantly more likely to adopt advanced technology, particularly through web-use. Our findings also suggest that privatized firms exhibit better technology adoption outcomes only when there is a clear private owner with a profit incentive and empowered to change. As with competition, the negative association that we find between governance and technology adoption on average in the ECA region is counter-intuitive but the effects are very small and driven by the CIS countries. By contrast, this relationship is reversed in the EU-8 countries where better governance is associated with stronger protection of property rights and contract enforcement, more business-friendly policies and where the regulatory regime does in fact provide incentives for technology adoption. These findings suggest that for CIS countries reducing the opportunities for rent-seeking and 'harassment' of successful firms by authorities and improvements in financial intermediation are likely to be associated with more frequent adoption of new technology.
Together with the aforementioned finding that in environments with severe credit constraints, firms with substantial rents are more likely to adopt advanced technology, this underscores the importance of improving market incentives in conjunction with efforts to improve access to international knowledge and the availability of critical complementary inputs.
The broad policy implication of our findings is therefore that in order to increase technology adoption by firms in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, there is a need for complementary reforms of the investment climate: improvements in the access to international knowledge, an increase in the availability of inputs complementary to knowledge within a wider framework of improving market incentives. Notes: Values are in percentage. ***, **, and * indicates a statistical difference from the rest of the sample at 1% 5%, and 10% confidence levels, respectively. Based on the total number of permanent workers employed by the firm.
Manager with College Education or More Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm's general manager highest level of education is a university degree or a higher university (post-graduate) degree.
Manager Age
Age of the firm's general manager.
Share of Professionals
Percentage of the firm's current permanent full time workers that are professionals (e.g., accountants, engineers, scientists).
R&D Intensity
Share in total firm sales of R&D expenditures (including wages and salaries of R&D personnel, materials, R&D related education and training costs). Access to Finance Dummy Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has a bank loan or overdraft.
Infrastructure Index
First principal component derived from factor analysis of (1) the average in the firm's city of the number of days with power outages or surges from the public grid and (2) the average in the firm's city of the number of days with unavailable mainline telephone service in the year prior to the survey. Percentage of the firm's equity owned by the largest shareholder.
Dummy for Market Share Equal to Less than 5% Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm's percetnage of the total market sales is less than 5% (available only in BEEPS 2002).
Price-Cost Margin (%) Margin by which the firm's sales price for its main product line or main line of services in the domestic exceeds its operating costs (i.e. materials inputs costs plus wages costs but not overheads and depreciation). Dummy for Pressure to Innovate from Competitors Being Important Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm ranks pressure from domestic or foreign competitors as being fairly important or very important for the firm's decisions about developing new products or services and markets. Dummy for Pressure to Innovate from Consumers Being Important Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm ranks pressure from customers as being fairly important or very important for the firm's decisions about developing new products or services and markets.
Elasticity of Demand Faced by Firm
If the firm were to raise the prices of its main product line or main line of services 10% above their current level in the domestic market (after allowing for any inflation) what would happen assuming that the firm's competitors maintained their current prices: (1) customers would continue to buy from the firm in the same quantities as now, (2) customers would continue to buy from the firm but at slightly lower quantities, (3) customers would continue to buy from the firm but at much lower quantities, (4) many customers would buy from the firm's competitors instead.
Number of Competitors
Number of competitors faced by the firm in its main product in the domestic market: none, 1-3, or 4 or more.
Governance Index
First principal component derived from factor analysis of (1) the 100% minus the percentage of firms in the firm's city that report that it is frequently, usually, or always true that firms in their line of business to have to pay some irregular "additional payment/gifts" to get things done with regard to customs, taxes, licenses, regulations, services, (2) the percentage of firms in the firm's city that tend to agree, agree in most cases, or strongly agree with the statement "I am confident that the legal system will uphold my contract and property rights in business disputes", (3) the percentage of firms in the firm's city that tend to agree, agree in most cases, or strongly agree that the interpretations of the laws and regulations affecting the firm are consistent and predicatable, and (4) 100% minus the average in the firm's city of the percentage of senior management time spent dealing with public officials about the application and interpretation of laws and regulations and to get or to maintain access to public services in the year prior to the survey. 
